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502 JACKS V. MONTEREY COUNTY TR. & SAV. BK. [20 C. (2d) 
withheld payments after 'the distraint warrants were lifted.' 
We are of the opinion that this claim cannot be sustained. 
"The trust instrument provided that in the event of the 
plaintiff's 'doing any of these inhibited things, or in the 
event that an attempt is made to subject said income or 
property, or any part thereof, to the payment of any of his 
debts or obligations, the trustee in its sole discretion may 
withhold any further payment or payments to said Romie 
C. Jack.' This language appears to be clear and unambigu-
ous. It was obviously the'trustor's intention to protect the 
gift from either attempts by plaintiff to anticipate the pay-( 
ments or attempts by plaintiff's creditors to subject suc~ 
payments to the satisfaction of their claims. To that end, 
the trustor gave to the trustee the sole discretion 'to with-
hold any further payment or payments' in the event any 
such attempt might be made. It was stipulated that such 
an attempt was made. 
"While the word 'withhold' may sometimes be used to 
connote a mere temporary holding back as contended by 
. plaintiff, it is probably more frequently used to connote a 
permanent retention or refraining 'from granting, giving, 
allowing, or the like.' (See Webster's New Inter. Dict., 2d 
ed.) A consideration of all of the terms creating the trust 
here compels the conclusion that the trustor intended to use 
the word' withhold' in the latter sense. We are dealing here 
with a typical spendthrift trust and the obvious purpose of 
the trustor in creating such a trust would be defeated by a 
construction which would permit the accumulation of the 
prescribed payments and the distribution of a large lump 
sum to the beneficiary at anyone time. 
"In view of the conclusions which we have reached, it 
becomes unnecessary to discuss the question of the right of 
plaintiff to interest as that right, if any would have existed, 
was dependent upon his right to judgment for some of the 
payments claimed by him." 
The judgment is reversed. 
Edmonds, J., did not participate herein. 
WAYNE HE~, 
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[So F. No. 16673. In Bank. July 2, 1942.] 
JOSEPH SKERNSWELL, Petitioner, V. GEORGE W. 
SCHONFELD, as Judge, etc., et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Mandamus.-Mandamus 
is an appropriate remedy where a trial court improperly re-
fuses to settle a bill of exceptions. 
[2]' Id.-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Time for Presentation.-
The time within which to present a proposed bill of exceptions 
does not start to run where the copies of the orders appealed 
from served on the respondent do not indicate that the orders 
had been filed with the clerk, and where no writ'ten notice of 
the filing or entry of the orders is given. (See Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 650, 651, 953d.) 
[3] Id.-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Duty of Judge.-A trial 
judge is not justified in refusing to settle a. proposed bill of 
exceptions on the ground that the orders specified. in. the no-
tice of appeal are nonappealable . 
[4] Id,-Record-Bill of Exceptions-Reference to Parts of Rec-
ord.-It is proper in a proposed bill of exceptions to make 
reference to certain documents that are to be copied at length 
in the final engrossed bill. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco and George 
W. Schonfeld, Judge thereof, to settle and certify a bill of 
exceptions. Writ issued. 
Marcel E. Cerf, Robinson & Leland and Henry Robinson 
for Petitioner. ' 
Joseph A. Brown and A. E. Cross for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This case raises a problem' of procedure 
upon which the parties have presented a stipulation of facts. 
In March, 1940, Julius Neustadt brought an action in' the 
superior court against Joseph Skernswell, and on May 26, 
1941, that court gave judgment in favor of Neustadt. On' 
[1] See 2 Cal. Jur. 567. .. . . '.' 
McK. Dig. References: (1] Appeal and Error, § 625; [2] Appeal 
and. Error, § 604; [3] Appeal and Error, § 594; [4] Appeal and 
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May 29th findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the judg-
ment were filed with the county clerk. On July 10th a motion 
for a new trial was denied, and on July 18th defendant filed 
notice of appeal. The appeal is now pending in this court. 
On July 28th the trial judge, at plaintiff's request, signed 
an order setting time of hearing the accounting by the ref-
eree, an order directing the referee to take possession of real 
property and to collect all rents and income, and an order 
directing the referee in partition to sell real property. Copies 
of the orders were served on defendant's attorney the same 
day but the orders were not filed with the clerk of the cour~ 
until the following day. On August 1st the trial judge, ~t 
plaintiff's request, signed a written order requiring a bond 
on appeal. This order was filed with the clerk of the court 
on the same day after a copy had been served on defendant's 
attorney. None of the copies served on defendant's attorney 
contained any statement indiC8.ting that the orders had been 
filed with the clerk The parties agree that no written notice 
of the filing or entry of any of these orders was given defen-
dant before the filing of the bill of exceptions. On Septem-
ber 10th defendant filed notice of appeal from these orders, 
and on September 19th served and on September 20th filed 
a proposed bill of exceptions to be used on the appeal. Plain-
tiff moved to strike the bill of exceptions from the record, 
and after a ,hearing th~. trial court made an order granting 
the motion. pefendant has petitioned this court for a writ 
of mandate ordering the trial court to settle and certify the 
bill of exceptions. . 
[1] If a trial court improperly refuses to settle a bill of ex-
ceptions, mandamus is an appropriate remedy. (See cases 
cited in 2 Cal. Jur. 567.) [2] A bill of exceptions must be pre" 
sented within twenty days after written notice of entry of 
the judgplent or order, from which the appeal is taken. (Code 
Civ. Proc., secs. 650, 651, 953d.) Notice of a judgment or 
order does not constitute notice of entry of the judgment or 
order. (Leach v. Pierce, 93 Cal. 614,621 [29 Pac. 235] ; 
Tobin Grocery Co. v. Spry, 201 Cal. 152 [255 Pac. 791J.) 
Since petitioner received no notice of the entry of the orders 
before the filing of the proposed bill of exceptions, the latter 
was presented in time. 
[3] Respondents contend that the trial court was justified 
in refusing' to settle the proposed bill of exceptions, on the 
around that the orders with which it is concerned are not 
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appealable. Sections 649, 650, and 651 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, however, contain no requirement that an order 
must be appealable before a bill of exceptions can be set-
tled with respect to it. It is not the function of, the '"trial 
court to pass upon the appealability of an order in settling 
a bill of exceptions. (G1£tierrez v. He7fbard, 106 Cal. 167, 
170 [39 Pac. 529, 935] ; Foley v. Foley, 120 Cal. 33, .38 [52 
Pac. 122, 65 Am. St. Rep. 147].) It is the trial court's duty 
to prepare a record that accurately indicates what happened 
in that court. If the partieplar order is not appealable; the 
bill of exceptions may be used upon appeal from some later 
judgment or order when the correctness' of the (lrder in ques-
tion will be reviewed. (Foley' v; Foley, supra.) If an appeal 
is taken from the particular order, the question of appeala-
bility should be presented to the appellate c6urtby am.6tion 
to dismiss after the record has been completed ,l1.nd placed 
before that court. (Gutierrez v. Hebbard, supra,):, . 
[4] Respondents contend finally that the proposed bill of ex-
ceptions is a skeleton bill, so incomplete .as to justify the 
trial court in refusing to settle it. Respondents, however, 
make no showing of fraud or lack of good:fa~thonthe part 
.~ of petitioner in presenting the bilI. (See Dainty Pretzel COl 
'- v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 437 [45 P: (2d)S17] ; 
Nichols v. Smith, 25 Cal. App~ (2d) 94 [76P. (2d) .525] ; 
Ambrose v.American Toll Bridge Co., 12 Cal. (2d) 276, 
279 [83 P. (2d) 499] ;Walkerley v. Greene, 104 Cal. 208, 212 
[37 Pac. 890].) It appears that the draft of the bill is in-
complete only to the extent that it merely makes reference 
to certain documents that are to be copied at length into 
the final engrossed bill. This is an established procedure. 
(St. Clair v. Bullock, 12 Cal. (2d) 450,454 [85' P. (2d) 867J ; 
Lakeshore Cattle Co. v. Modoc Land & L. Oo.~127 Cal.37~ 
39 [59 Pac. 206] ; Houghton v. Superior Court,128 Cal. 352, 
354 [60 Pac. 972]; Reclamation District v. Hamilton, 112 
Cal. 603 [44 Pac. 1074].) 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Car--
ter. J't concurred. 
